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Abstract
We study the problem of strategic choice of arrival time to a single-server queue with opening
and closing times when there is uncertainty regarding service speed. A Poisson population of
customers choose their arrival time with the goal of minimizing their expected waiting times
and are served on a first-come first-served basis. There are two types of customers that differ
in their beliefs regarding the service time distribution. The inconsistent beliefs may arise from
randomness in the server state along with noisy signals that customers observe. Customers are
aware of the two types of populations with differing beliefs. We characterize the Nash equilibrium
dynamics for exponentially distributed service times and show how they substantially differ
from the model with homogeneous customers. We further provide an explicit solution for a fluid
approximation of the game. For general service time distributions we provide an algorithm for
computing the equilibrium in a discrete time setting. We find that in equilibrium customers with
different beliefs arrive during different (and often disjoint) time intervals. Numerical analysis
further shows that the mean waiting time increases with the coefficient of variation of the service
time. Furthermore, we present a learning agent based model (ABM) in which customers make
joining decisions based solely on their signals and past experience. We numerically compare the
long-term average outcome of the ABM with that of the equilibrium and find that the arrival
distributions are quite close if we assume (for the equilibrium solution) that customers are fully
rational and have knowledge of the system parameters, while they may greatly differ if customers
have limited information or computing abilities.
1 Introduction
A bottleneck arrival game is typically modeled as a queue that operates during a specified period of
time and has to serve a finite population of incoming customers who can choose their arrival time.
In the queueing literature this is known as the ?/M/1 model introduced by Glazer and Hassin in
[8]. The characteristics of a congested bottleneck queue are often not the same on different days
and customers arriving at the bottleneck may not be aware of the current state on a given day.
For example, the duration of an airport security check can differ from day to day and location to
location depending on many variables such as staffing issues and specific security alerts. Moreover,
customers may have different beliefs regarding the speed of service due to past experience and
private information obtained from external sources such as the media or friends. Customers can
choose when to arrive to the queue with the goal of minimizing their expected waiting times, but the
uncertainty regarding the service times implies that customers are heterogeneous when evaluating
expected waiting times. We study the simplest model for this situation by assuming that there
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are two possible service states, “fast” and “slow”, and two distinct populations of customers each
believing that the state is one of the possibilities. We assume that the total number of customers
arriving at any given day is a Poisson random variable and analyze both continuous time and
discrete times cases.
A Nash equilibrium is given by a set of, possibly mixed, arrival strategies for every type of
customer belief. For the case of exponential service times we characterize the Nash equilibrium
arrival dynamics of both customer types and show that solving them is a much more challenging
task than in the standard model with homogeneous customer beliefs (e.g., [11]). Partial results for
the equilibrium arrival strategies are derived along with a conjecture on a general solution. The
intractability of the continuous time Markovian model leads us to consider a deterministic fluid
approximation of a large scale system (many customers with very small jobs) which can be solved
explicitly. We further consider a discrete time system with general service times where customers
can only be admitted into the queue at specified time slots. If the time slots are very close then
this can approximate the continuous time setting, but the model also captures the dynamics of a
system with limited admission times (e.g., a day with three admission periods: morning, afternoon
and evening). Furthermore, moving away from exponential service times enables the examination
of the effect of the variance of the service time distribution. This framework is useful because it
is very general, but explicit analysis seems intractable and so we present an algorithmic procedure
for the computation of the Nash equilibrium arrival distributions. For the continuous and discrete
time settings we show that there are multiple types of equilibrium arrival distributions, including
everyone arriving at the opening, one class of customers at the beginning and the other according to
a mixed distribution during the working hours, or both arriving according to a mixed distribution.
We further present a random service model with noisy signals that may result in inconsistent
customer beliefs due to information asymmetry. Suppose that the server state is assigned randomly
every day according to a fixed probability p ∈ [0, 1] (for slow service) and a signaling mechanism
revals the true state with a high probability q > 12 . This model is similar to the setting of the join
or balk game studied in [6]. This results in seemingly inconsistent customer beliefs regarding the
service time distribution that correspond to the posterior distributions given the signal observed.
Therefore, through this service uncertainty model and signal mechanism we have a game that is
in fact consistent with an assumption of homogeneous customers from a Bayesian point of view.
It is important to point out that after receiving signal customers make a posterior update of
the service time distribution, and therefore even if the original distribution was exponential the
posterior distribution is no longer exponential. Therefore, the numerical procedure for computing
the equilibrium for a general service time distribution in the discrete time setting is very useful.
In order to compute the optimal arrival strategies the customers must be aware of all of the
system parameters, including the characteristics of customers with different beliefs and the quality
of the signal they receive. Furthermore, the customers must be able to use the available information
to make posterior updates regarding the sizes of both population types, knowing that some received
a wrong signal, and their respective service time distributions. However, in some settings customers
may not be aware of all of the relevant system parameters and of the quality of the signal. This
leads us to explore several assumptions on the information available to customers and their level
of rationality. In particular we consider both the equilibrium in a fully rational setting and also
the case where customers do not make posterior update, be it due to lack of information regarding
the parameters or due to limited computing ability. We refer to the latter as a bounded rationality
assumption. Moreover, we introduce a dynamic learning agent based model (ABM) where cus-
tomers update their estimators for the expecting waiting time given their signal and actual delay
in the system on previous days with the same signal. The learning procedure is a mixture between
randomly testing new time slots (exploration) and choosing a time slot that was optimal in the
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past on average (exploitation) such that the probability of exploration decreases to zero with time.
The equilibrium in the discrete setting is numerically compared to the dynamic learning model.
In equilibrium, for both the fully rational and bounded rationality cases, the customers with dif-
ferent types of beliefs arrive on mostly disjoint intervals. This observation is also backed up by
the explicit solution of the fluid model. As the ABM does not assume customer knowledge of the
system parameters, i.e., the arrival rates, service time distributions, true state probability p and
signal quality q, there is an inherent estimation bias of the expected waiting time. This is because
on a proportion of 1−q of the days the signal is wrong and the delay observations are misclassified.
However, the long-term outcome of the ABM appears is much closer to the full information equilib-
rium solution than to the bounded rationality equilibrium solution. We further show that this bias
generally makes the arrival distributions more spread out, and also not disjoint for the two beliefs,
which increases the average waiting times compared to the full information equilibrium, but less
so than the equilibrium arising from a game that ignores the signal quality. In fact, in some cases
social welfare is higher for the completely ignorant customers in the ABM than in the equilibrium
solution when customers make the wrong assumptions (in the bounded rationality case).
Main contributions. We now summarize the main contributions of our work.
• Heterogeneous customers: Thus far, the literature on bottleneck queue arrival games has
mostly assumed homogeneous customers. This paper is the first to analyze a game with a
discrete (non-fluid) population and customers with heterogeneous beliefs regarding the service
time distribution.
• Asymmetric information: We present a simple model for a bottleneck queue arrival game
with service quality uncertainty and provide equilibrium analysis for both the Markovian and
non-Markovian settings. Our framework further enables studying different levels of available
information and customer rationality.
• Discrete game with large time slots: For the discrete game we provide a framework to analyze
the equilibrium when the acceptance period is divided into big time slots such that multiple
jobs can be served within a time slot. This is more general than discrete systems with
small time slots that aim to approximate continuous time, and the resulting equilibrium
distributions can be quite different.
• Bounded rationality and learning: Our framework enables the comparison of equilibrium
outcomes with various assumptions regarding the information availability and the level of
rationality of the customers. The equilibrium arrival distributions are further compared
with the outcome of a learning process in which customers update their decisions based on
past experiences by estimating the expected waiting time corresponding to every pair of time
choice and signal. This allows us to examine the effect of the biased estimation in the learning
process as opposed to the limited and full information equilibrium solutions.
Background and related literature. The research on strategic queueing deals with many
aspects of decision making in queueing systems. An introduction and overview of this research can
be found in [10] and [9]. The ?/M/1 model of Glazer and Hassin [8] was the first to consider an
endogenous arrival process to a queue that is determined by strategic considerations of the arriving
customers. The server was assumed to start working in time zero and customers choose their
arrival time with the goal of minimizing expected waiting costs. It was assumed that customers
can queue before the server commences operations, an assumption which was later removed in
[11] that considered a finite accpetance period. The latter established that the equilibrium arrival
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distribution has an atom at zero, an interval with no arrivals and a continuous distribution on a
continuous interval. The socially optimal arrival distribution was numerically analyzed and it was
shown that it is optimal to allow arrivals on a discrete set of times. The model was later extended
to include tardiness penalties in [18] and [12], order penalties in [22], a loss system in [14], and a
network of queues in [15]. The issues of existence and uniqueness of equilibrium were addressed
in detail in [18]. In [1] the model was generalized to general service times, i.e., ?/G/1, and it was
shown that the equilibrium has the same form and uniqueness properties, but is much harder to
compute the arrival distribution. A fluid approximation for a game with heterogeneous customers
that differ in their cost functions was presented in [19]. The discrete-time version of the ?/G/1
game was analysed in [23], which also presented an algorithm to compute the equilibrium. This
discrete-time setting can be used as an approximation for the continuous time model when taking
a large number of small time slots. Moreover, [23] presented the dynamic learning model which is
extended here to allow multiple customer types. A more detailed review of the literature on arrival
time games can be found in Chapter 4.1 of [9].
Observable queues with customers deciding to join or balk based on noisy signals regarding the
service speed and value were studied in [25] and [6]. A queueing game with incosistent customer
beliefs regarding the service rate of an M/M/1 system was studied in [4]. They considered the
problem of joining or balking an observable queue when the service rate beliefs of customers are
generated by a common continuous distribution; the optimal strategy is derived and shown to have
a threshold form, where the threshold depends on the individual belief of the customer. In [16]
a model with anecdotal reasoning of customers was introduced: before deciding whether to join
an unobservable queue customers obtain a noisy signal in the form of a (single) past experience
of an aquaitance who joined the queue. The equilibrium outcome was compared with a fully
rational benchmark. The impact of uncertainty regarding server capacity on staffing and control
of multiserver queues was investigated in [17].
Paper organization. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
queueing and game model. Section 3 analyzes the continuous time game with exponential service
times. In particular, highlighting the difficulty of solving the equilibrium dynamics even in the
simplest Markovian setting which can be solved by standard methods in the case of homogeneous
beliefs. In Section 4 we present the explicit equilibrium solution for a fluid model that can be viewed
as an approximation of a large scale system with many small customers that have negligible service
times. Section 5 defines the stochastic discrete-time game and provides a numerical method to
compute the equilibrium distributions, with numerical analysis of the method given in 5.3. Section
6 presents the agent based model and discusses the estimation bias associated with it. Furthermore,
the latter also provides numerical analysis and comparison of the discrete game and agent based
model. Section 7 concludes the paper with a discussion of the results and potential future research.
2 Model and Preliminaries
A population of N ∼Poisson(λ) customers need to arrive at a queue during an acceptance period
T ⊆ [0, T ] such that 0 ∈ T . Time t = 0 is referred to as the opening time. The acceptance period
may be a continuous interval T = [0, T ] or a discrete collection of times T = {0, t1, . . . , tn}. All
customers arriving during the acceptance period are served, even if service is completed after the
acceptance period. The jobs in the queue are processed FCFS and if two, or more, jobs arrive at
the same time then they are uniformly ordered at random.
There are two types of customers C := {a, b} that differ in their belief regarding the service time
distribution X. Type a customers are pessimistic and believe the service rate is “slow” and type
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b customers are optimistic and believe the service rate is “fast”. Further denote λi := λαi, where
αi ∈ (0, 1) is the proportion of customers with belief i ∈ C. We next provide a formal definition for
a customer belief and the assumption that distinguishes between the two types of service.
Definition 1. A customer holds belief i ∈ C if his expected waiting time for any chosen arrival
strategy is given by that of a queueing process with iid services times distributed as the random
variable Xi with cdf Gi, together with the arrival process defined by the strategies of all customers.
Assumption 1. The expected service time corresponding to belief a is higher than that correspond-
ing to belief b; χa := EXa > EXb =: χb.
Examples:
1. Exponential service times with a slower service rate for type a, µa < µb.
2. Deterministic service times: χa > χb.
3. Discrete-time memoryless service: geometric service times with success probabilities 1χa <
1
χb
.
The reasoning for inconsistent beliefs is information asymmetry regarding the service capacity
of the system. This may be due to different past experience. For example, some customers may
be repeat customers that have an estimate of the capacity based on their experience while others
may be joining for the first time and only rely on some common knowledge regarding the system.
Another option is a system with random capacity where some customers acquire a noisy signal
regarding the true system state. In Section 2.1 a random environment and signal mechanism are
introduced such that the system state, slow or fast, is random and the customers receive noisy
signals regarding the true state. Throughout the paper we use the terms “customer with belief i”
and ”type i customer” synonymously.
Customers wish to avoid waiting and choose their arrival time to the queue with the goal of
minimizing expected waiting time. An arrival strategy for a customer is given by a probability
distribution on T and can be represented by a cdf F (t). We denote the support of an arrival
strategy F by σ(F ) := inf{S ⊆ T s.t. ∫s∈S F (ds) = 1}. We focus our analysis on the symmetric
(within types) case where all customers of type i ∈ C use the same strategy Fi.
Let A(t) denote the cumulative arrival process of customers to the system. Given an arrival
profile (Fa, Fb), the amount of customers arriving during an interval (s, t] is a Poisson random
variable (by applying the Poisson splitting property),
A(t)−A(s) ∼ Poisson(λa(Fa(t)− Fa(s)) + λb(Fb(t)− Fb(s))) .
Furthermore, if Fa, Fb are continuous distributions then the arrival process is a non-homogeneous
Poisson process with cumulative rate λaFa(t) + λbFb(t) (see, e.g., Chapter 2 of [5]). Observe that
all customers assume the same arrival process, regardless of their individual belief, because it does
not depend on the service times.
The assumption of a Poisson number of customers is convenient for several reasons. First of
all, as explained above, it implies a Markovian (nonhomegenous in time) arrival process. This
makes the analysis of the queueing bottlneck game easier than the seemingly simple case of a
determinstic number of arrivals, which is in fact as difficult to analyze as the case of a general
random variable (see [18, 14]). Furthermore, this assumption is appropiate in a setting where a big
population of potential customers arrive with a small probability, due to the Poisson approximation
of a Binomial random variable. Another attractive property of the Poisson number of players is
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that under standard axiomatic assumptions, for any tagged customer the conditional number of
other customers joining is also Poisson random variable with the same mean (e.g., [13]).
Let Wi(t) denote the waiting time for a type i ∈ C customer arriving at t. The distribution
of the waiting time depends on the specific assumptions made on the service distribution, and we
will consider several cases in this paper. Customers wish to arrive at a time t that minimizes their
expected waiting time
wi(t;Fa, Fb) := E[Wi(t)| Types a and b choose Fa and Fb, respectively]
We are interested in stable arrival profiles (Fa, Fb) such that no customer can decrease their expected
waiting time.
Definition 2. A symmetric (within types) Nash equilibrium is given by a pair of distributions
(Fa, Fb) such that for i ∈ C,
wi(t;Fa, Fb) = wi(s;Fa, Fb), ∀s, t ∈ σ(Fi) ,
and
wi(t;Fa, Fb) ≤ wi(s;Fa, Fb), ∀t ∈ σ(Fi), s ∈ T .
It is important to note that a customer with belief i assumes that the service time distribution of
all customers is Xi, regardless of their types (or beliefs). This is in sharp contrast to a system with
two types of customers with different service distributions. Therefore, the expected waiting time
wi(t;Fa, Fb) corresponds to a different queueing process for the two types of customers {a, b}. For
example, in the continuous time setting, type a customers believe the queue is an Mt/Ga/1 system
while type b customer believe it is an Mt/Gb/1 system. Furthermore, the “true” distribution of the
service times (and queueing process) may be one of the two beliefs or neither, and it is not relevant
for the equilibrium calculations as customers make their decisions according to their designated
belief. It is further assumed that customers are aware of the information asymmetry and thus of
the presence of customers with a belief that is inconsistent with their own.
2.1 Signal mechanism
This section illustrates how a system with random environment and noisy signals can lead to
inconsistent beliefs regarding the service speed, even if the customers are otherwise homogeneous.
On a given day, the server operates in mode a with probability p, otherwise, it operates in mode b
with probability 1− p. Let M denote the service mode, i.e., its probability distribution is given by
P(M = a) = p, P(M = b) = 1− p.
The service time in mode i (i ∈ C = {a, b}) is denoted by a random variable Xi with mean
χi. As before, we assume that χa > χb, i.e., the service time in mode a is slower than one in
mode b. For every customer k let Sk ∈ {0, 1} be a Bernoulli random variable denoting whether
the true state is observed or not (1 indicating the true state). We assume that Sk are iid with
P(Sk = 1) = P(S = 1) = q, where q ∈ (12 , 1], and that they are also independent of M . Let Y
denote the signal received by arbitrary customer, then
Y = MS + (a+ b−M)(1− S) .
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The marginal probability for a customer to receive a type i ∈ C signal is
P(Y = i) =

pq + (1− p)(1− q), i = a ,
p(1− q) + (1− p)q, i = b .
Let αji := P(Yh = j|Yk = i) denote the conditional probability that any other customer h has a
signal Yh = j given that customer k received signal i for (i, j) ∈ C2. Then we have
αji =
P({MSh + (a+ b−M)(1− Sh) = j} ∩ { MSk + (a+ b−M)(1− Sk) = i})
P(MSk + (a+ b−M)(1− Sk) = i) ,
and therefore,
αja =

pq2+(1−p)(1−q)2
pq+(1−p)(1−q) , j = a ,
pq(1−q)+(1−p)(1−q)q
pq+(1−p)(1−q) , j = b ,
(1)
and
αjb =

p(1−q)q+(1−p)q(1−q)
p(1−q)+(1−p)q , j = a ,
p(1−q)2+(1−p)q2
p(1−q)+(1−p)q , j = b .
(2)
The total number of customers is a Poisson random variable with mean λ. Therefore, for a customer
with signal Y = i ∈ C the number of customers with the same signal is Poisson with mean λαii
and the number of customers with the opposite signal j 6= i, is λαji. Let νi := λ(αai, αbi) denote
the mean size of populations seen by a customer with signal i.
The posterior service time distribution of a customer with signal Y = i is given by the mixture
X˜i = ηaiXa + ηbiXb, where ηji := P(M = j|Y = i) (i, j ∈ C) is given by
(ηaa, ηba) :=
(pq, (1− p)(1− q))
pq + (1− p)(1− q) , (ηab, ηbb) :=
(p(1− q), (1− p)q)
p(1− q) + (1− p)q .
Moreover, the posterior expected service time is
ζi = E[X˜i] = E[XM |Y = i] =

χapq+χb(1−p)(1−q)
pq+(1−p)(1−q) , i = a ,
χap(1−q)+χb(1−p)q
p(1−q)+(1−p)q , i = b .
(3)
The signal mechanism results in two populations of customers with distinct service time beliefs
given by X˜a and X˜b.
2.2 Beliefs, information and bounded rationality
In the prequel it was assumed that customers can fully compute all of the above posterior distri-
butions, and implicitly that they know p and q. If the only information available to them is that
q > 12 then ζi = χi is a reasonable assumption. However, there needs to be additional information
or some prior belief in order to determine λa and λb. In other cases the customers may have no
knowledge about the uncertainty mechanism and simply have prior beliefs according to their past
experience or the anecdotal experiences of other customers.
Throughout the paper we consider several different assumptions of customer rationality and
knowledge.
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(FR) Fully informed rational customers: Customers know all of the system parameters and can
compute the respective posterior distributions (X˜a, X˜b). For a customer with signal a (resp.
b), the posterior service-time distribution is given by X˜a (resp. X˜b), and the mean size of
populations is given by νa (resp. νb).
(BR) Customers with bounded rationality or limited information: Customers either do not know p
or q, or are unable to make the posterior distribution computations. Customers trust their
signal (assuming q > 12). The service times of the beliefs are given by (Xa, Xb) with means
(χa, χb). Customers further have prior beliefs regarding the population sizes λa and λb which
may, or may not, correspond the posterior service rates computed in the prequel.
(L) Agent-based model : Customers are not maximizing expected utility but rather optimize their
behavior by learning the system behavior from repeated experiences. Every day they receive
a signal regarding the server state and make an arrival time choice. After every day customers
update their estimated delay for every time period given the signal obtained.
Note that (FR) and (BR) both yield a Nash equilibrium, even though the customers may not
be fully rational. Assumption (L), however, does not assume any kind of equilibrium outcome.
Section 3 considers a fully Markovian model which corresponds to (BR): every type of customer
has a different belief regarding the rate of the exponential service times. A deterministic fluid
approximation of the system is presented in Section 4. The fluid model can be used to approximate
either (FR) or (BR) and yields an explicit solution for any given parameters. The discrete time
model of Section 5 enables numerical analysis of both (FR) and (BR) in a stochastic setting. In
our numerical analysis of the discrete time model we consider several examples with service times
that follow deterministic, geometric, and a mixture of geometric distributions; where the first two
cases correspond to (FR) and the latter to (BR) (for a Markovian system with discrete geometric
service times). A model building on Assumption (L) is introduced in Section 6. The outcomes of
the different models are compared numerically in Sections 5.3, 6.2 and 6.1.
3 Exponential service times
This section discusses the properties and dynamics of the symmetric (within type) Nash equilibrium
arrival profiles for the case of exponential service times and a continuous acceptance period [0, T ].
Before proceeding to the characterization of the equilibrium arrival profile we first review the
properties of the homogeneous beliefs model.
Homogeneous beliefs
Suppose for now that all customers share the common belief that the exponential parameter of the
service time distribution is µ. The number of customers is a Poisson random variable with mean λ.
In this case the game reduces to the ?/M/1 queue of [8, 11]. Let F denote the symmetric arrival cdf
and consider a tagged customer that wants to choose an arrival time that minimizes their expected
delay. Denote the total number of arrivals until time t by AF (t). As explained in Section 2, due to
the Poisson splitting property, we have that AF (t) ∼Poisson(λF (t)). Further denote by QF (t) the
queue length that a customer arriving at time t faces, then (e.g., [18]),
q(t;F ) := E[QF (t)] = λF (t−) + 1
2
λ(F (t)− F (t−))− µ
∫ t
0
P(QF (u) > 0) du , (4)
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where g(t−) := lims↑t g(s) for any function g. The first term is the number of expected arrivals
up to time t, the second term is the proportion of the new additional customers that also arrived
at time t and are admitted before the tagged customer (recall that customers arriving together
are ordered randomly), and the third term corresponds to the expected number of departures. By
the memoryless property of the exponential service times, the expected waiting time of a tagged
customer arriving at t is
w(t;F ) =
1
µ
q(t;F ) .
Minimizing expected waiting time is therefore equivalent to minimizing expected queue length.
Definition 2 of the Nash equilibrium states that an arrival strategy F is a symmetric equilibrium if
and only if the expected delay is constant on all of the support F and higher outside of the support
σ(F ). In other words, if F is an equilibrium arrival distribution then there exists some constant
C > 0 such that q(t;F ) = C for any time t that is chosen with positive probability. We next outline
how such a solution can be constructed.
Clearly, F has an atom at time t = 0; F (0) > 0. Otherwise, q(0;F ) = 0 and arriving at t = 0
is the best response. Given F (0) the expected queue length at time zero is
q0 := q(0;F ) =
λF (0)
2
. (5)
Note that here we have used the assumption that customers arriving together are randomly ordered
and therefore half of those arriving at zero will be in front of the tagged customer if he joins at
time zero as well. By Definition 2, in equilibrium q(t;F ) = q(0;F ) for any t ∈ σ(F ). After the
opening at t = 0 there is an interval (0, te) with no arrivals, i.e., F (te) = F (0), because (4) has an
upward discontinuity at zero. Intuitively, arriving immediately after a mass of arrivals cannot be a
best response. Moreover, there cannot be an additional atom in any t ∈ (0, T ] because arriving just
before the atom yields a lower expected queue length; q(t−;F ) < q(t;F ). Therefore, the remainder
of the distribution is continuous, with density f , on the interval [te, T ], such that q(t;F ) = q(0;F )
for all t ∈ [te, T ] and F (0)+
∫ T
te
f(t) dt = 1. The equilibrium density is given by the unique solution
to the functional differential equation (obtained by taking derivative of (4)),
λf(t) = µP(QF (t) > 0) . (6)
There is no explicit solution to (6) because the transient probability P(QF (t) > 0) does not admit
a closed form solution due to the elaborate dependence on the arrival strategy F . Nevertheless,
the solution is unique and can be computed by solving the Kolmogorov backward equations of the
Markovian queue length process. We refer interested readers to [8, 11, 18] for more details on this
model. To summarize, the equilibrium arrival distribution is given by an atom at zero F (0) and a
continuous arrival density f(t) on [te, T ] for some te ∈ [0, T ]. Note that F (0) = 1 and te = T are
possible if λ is very big relatively to µT .
Heterogeneous beliefs game
Moving on to the case of customers with heterogeneous beliefs regarding the service rate. The
beliefs of customers of type i ∈ C corresponds to an exponential random variable with rate µi such
that µb > µa. A symmetric equilibrium is now given by a pair of arrival distributions (Fa, Fb)
simultaneously satisfying the equilibrium conditions. Each service time belief corresponds to a
different queueing process. In particular, let Qi denote the queue length process corresponding to
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belief i ∈ C, while keeping in mind that this process is a function of the arrival distribution (Fa, Fb),
then the expected queue length of (4) is adapted to
qi(t) := E[Qi(t)] =
∑
j∈C
λjFj(t−) + 1
2
∑
j∈C
λj(Fj(t)− Fj(t−))− µi
∫ t
0
P(Qi(u) > 0) du . (7)
As before, the equilibrium condition for a type i customer is that there exists some constant Ci > 0
such that qi(t) = Ci for all t ∈ σ(Fi). However, we now seek a pair (Fa, Fb) that simultaneously
solves the condition for both types. First observe that the expected queue length at time t = 0 is
identical for both types because service has not started yet,
q0 := qa(0) = qb(0) =
λaFa(0) + λbFb(0)
2
. (8)
For the same reasons as before, the equilibrium solutions have the following properties: there
is a positive atom at time t = 0 for at least one of the equilibrium arrival distributions, i.e.,
Fa(0) = Fb(0) = 0 is not possible, arriving just after t = 0 is not optimal for both type of customers
and there are no additional atoms during t ∈ (0, T ]. Hence, for each type i with Fi(0) > 0 there
exists a time ti ∈ (0, T ) such that Fi(ti) = Fi(0) and Fi is continuous on (ti, T ]. The first important
difference from the homogeneous case is that Fi(0) = 0 for i ∈ C implies qi(t) ≤ q0 for any t ∈ σ(Fi).
In other words it is possible that one type of customers arrive continuously during the service period
with no mass at the opening (but this is not possible for both types simultaneously).
The dynamic equations for the continuous part of the of the equilibrium distributions are as
follows. If only the arrival density of type a customers is positive at time t ∈ (0, T ]; fa(t) > 0 = fb(t)
then taking derivative of (7) yields
λafa(t) = µaP(Qa(t) > 0) . (9)
Similarly, if only the arrival density of type b customers is positive at time t ∈ (0, T ]; fb(t) > 0 =
fa(0), then
λbfb(t) = µbP(Qb(t) > 0) , (10)
However, when both types of customers arrive simultaneously; fa(t), fb(t) > 0, then the equilibrium
condition is given by
λafa(t) + λbfb(t) = µaP(Qa(t) > 0) ,
λafa(t) + λbfb(t) = µbP(Qb(t) > 0) .
(11)
Observe that (11) in fact generalizes (9) and (10) by setting one of the densities to zero in either case.
The Markov chain corresponding to the queue length process Qi(t) has the same nonhomegenous
arrival rate λafa(t) + λbfb(t) for both i = a, b, but the output rate µi is different for each type.
The transient idle probabilities can as before be numerically evaluated by solving the Kolmogorov
backward equations.
We next state two lemmas that will be used to characterize the equilibrium arrival profile.
The proof of Lemma 2 relies on a coupling argument for the virtual workload which is detailed in
Appendix A.
Lemma 2. For any arrival profile (Fa, Fb) such that Fi(0) > 0 for at least one of i ∈ C the expected
queue length faced by type a customers is higher than that faced by type b customers: qa(t) > qb(t)
for all t > 0.
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Lemma 3. For any Nash equilibrium (Fa, Fb), if Fb(0) > 0 then Fa(0) = 1.
Proof. If Fb(0) > 0 then for any t /∈ σ(Fb) \ {0} the equilibrium conditions state that qb(t) ≥ q0 for
all t > 0, otherwise if qb(t) < q0 it is better for a single customer to deviate and arrive at t. From
Lemma 2 we have that qa(t) > qb(t) ≥ q0, hence type a customers will not arrive at any t > 0.
The previous two lemmas leave us with two following possibilities for Nash equilibrium arrival
profiles that are summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 4. If (Fa, Fb) are Nash equilibrium arrival strategies then only one of the following holds:
(i) Fa(0) = 1, Fb(0) > 0 and
∫ T
tb
fb(t) dt = 1− Fb(t), where fb(t) is the unique solution to (10).
(ii) Fa(0) ∈ (0, 1], Fb(0) = 0 and there exist two arrival sets Ta, Tb ⊆ (0, T ] such that
∫
t∈Ta fa(t) dt =
1−Fa(0) and
∫
t∈Tb fb(t) dt = 1, where (fa(t), fb(t)) satisfy (9), (10) and (11). Note that Ta = ∅
if Fa(0) = 1.
We conjecture that the second type of equilibrium in fact has a much more specific form, namely
that excluding t = 0 customers of different types arrive on disjoint intervals. This conclusion relies
on the following conjecture regarding the equilibrium dynamics in the interior of the acceptance
period.
Conjecture 5. There is no time t > 0 such that both types of customers arrive simultaneously;
σ(Fa) ∩ σ(Fb) ∩ (0, T ] = ∅.
The reasoning for this conjecture is as follows: If type i ∈ C customers arrive at a positive rate,
λifi(t) > 0, then the functional differential equation (11) maintaining the expected queue length
qi(t) is constant must be satisfied. Suppose that on an interval (t1, t2) at least one of the types i ∈ C
arrives with a positive density, i.e., fi(t) > 0 for all t ∈ (t1, t2). Let Λi(t) := λafa(t)+λbfb(t) denote
a solution of the functional differential equations (11), one equation for each type i ∈ C, then by
Lemma 9 of [18] each equation admits a unique solution Λi() on the interval (t1, t2). Furthermore,
these unique solutions are monotone increasing with the initial queue length distribution Qi(t1).
We have been able to rule out the existence of a pair of distinct initial distributions (Qa(t1), Qb(t1))
along with rates µa < µb such that the two solutions for two different differential equations coincide
on a non-empty interval; Λa(t) = Λb(t) for all t ∈ [t1, t2]. Such a situation seems unlikely but due
to the elaborate dynamics of the functional differential equations we have been unable to establish
a proof of non-existence.
If Conjecture 5 does not hold then there exist multiple equilibria because any combination
of (fa(t), fb(t)) such that λa(t) = λb(t) = λafa(t) + λbfb(t) is also an equilibrium. Otherwise,
the uniqueness arguments for the single-class case (e.g., see [18]) can be applied directly to the
equilibrium arrival rates on the disjoint arrival intervals.
4 Fluid approximation
We next consider a fluid model that approximates the case where the expected population size is
very big and service times are very small. In the exponential setting one can think of the limiting
system: λi → ∞ and µi → ∞ as n → ∞ for i ∈ C, while maintaining λiµi → Ci ∈ (0,∞). Note
that this approximation is applicable also to non-Markovian systems for which the service times
are not exponentially distributed and/or the total number of customers is not Poisson distributed.
Fluid models are often used to analyze queueing systems with elaborate dynamics (e.g., [3]). In
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particular, they are also used in many queueing game papers, e.g., [7] for a join/balk game in an
observable system with a server that alternates between fast and slow service. We refer the reader
to [18] for rigorous justification of this approximation for the bottleneck queue arrival game (see
also [12]).
There are two deterministic fluid populations of volumes λa and λb with each individual cus-
tomer corresponding to a drop with infinitesimal service duration. Type i ∈ C customers believe
that the deterministic output rate is µi, where µa < µb. As before, we denote the strategies of type
i customers by the cdf Fi. Given strategies (Fa, Fb) the fluid input to the queue during any interval
(t1, t2) ⊂ T is
λa(Fa(t2)− Fa(t1)) + λb(Fb(t2)− Fb(t1)) .
The equilibrium solutions for Fi will be shown to be continuous with a density denoted by fi. The
potential output corresponding to the belief of type i customers during the interval is µi(t2 − t1),
where the actual output may be lower in case the queue is empty during some or all of the interval.
In particular, if we denote the queue length at time t corresponding to belief i ∈ C by qi(t), then
the output rate of the system at t is
µi1(qi(t) > 0) + min{µi, λafa(t) + λbfb(t)}1(qi(t) = 0) .
As we will show, there are equilibria such that the queue is empty for any t ∈ [0, T ] for one or
both types of customers. We refer to such cases as a degenerate equilibrium because they imply
that customers experience no delays and the system is in fact not a bottleneck. The deterministic
dynamics of the queue at t ∈ [0, T ] as long as the queue is never empty, which is the case in
equilibrium, are given by
qi(t) =
∑
j∈C
λj
∫ t
0
dFj(u)− µit, i ∈ C . (12)
Relying on Definition 2, a Nash equilibrium is a profile (Fa, Fb) such that for qi(t) is constant
throughout the support σ(Fi) (and higher or equal outside of the support).
Due to the deterministic dynamics of (12) the queue length process for type a dominates
that of type b, as was established for the stochastic model in the previous section, and therefore
we obtain the same structure as in Theorem 4. In particular, if a positive volume of optimistic
customers arrive at the opening, Fb(0) > 0, then all pessimistic customers arrive at the opening,
Fa(0) = 1. If , however, Fb(0) = 0 then Fa(0) > 0 and the remaining customers of each type arrive
continuously on disjoint intervals (as conjectured in Conjecture 5). Furthermore, in the latter
case there are parameter settings such that the optimistic customers expect zero delay while the
pessimistic customers expect a positive delay. Moreover, there may exist multiple equilibria of this
type. For any non-degenerate equilibrium, i.e., one that all customers expect positive delay, all of
the pessimistic customers arrive before the optimistic customers. Finally, there also exist multiple
fully degenerate equilibria such that all customers expect zero delay and a queue is never formed.
The degenerate solutions arise in cases such that the system capacity, corresponding to one or both
types of beliefs, is high enough (with respect to the length of the admission period) to process all
incoming.
We first state a lemma that establishes the properties of the equilibrium discussed above. These
properties correspond to Lemma 3 and Conjecture 5 in the stochastic model of Section 3. The main
result of this section is Theorem 7 that details the explicit solution and conditions for all cases.
Lemma 6. For any non-degenrate Nash equilibrium, i.e., qi(t) > 0 for any i ∈ C and t ∈ [0, T ],
the following hold:
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(i) If Fb(t) > 0 for t ∈ [0, T ] then Fa(t) = 1.
(ii) There is no time t > 0 such that both types of customers arrive simultaneously; σ(Fa) ∩
σ(Fb) ∩ (0, T ] = ∅.
Proof. We first establish (i) for t = 0. The expected queue size ahead of an arbitrary chosen
customer arriving at time t = 0 is q0 =
λaFa(0)+λbFb(0)
2 , regardless of the customer type, and the
respective waiting time for a type i customer is q0µi . If Fb(0) > 0 then, due to the deterministic
dynamics of the queue in (12), µb > µa implies that qa(t) > qb(t) ≥ q0, hence Fa(0) = 1.
Next we verify (ii). Let fa, fb denote the density of the continuous equilibrium arrival of types a
and b, respectively. If fb(t) > 0 for t ∈ (0, T ] then the equilibrium condition of keeping the expected
queue length qb(t) constant is obtained by taking derivative of (12), yielding
λafa(t) + λbfb(t) = µb > µa .
Therefore, the expected queue length qa(t) is increasing and and thus fa(t) = 0. Similarly, if
fa(t) > 0 then qb(t) is decreasing and fb(t) = 0.
We are left with verifying (i) for t ∈ (0, T ]. We consider an equilibrium (Fa, Fb) such that
Fa(0) ∈ (0, 1) and Fb(0) = 0 and show that if there exists some t such that Fa(t) < 1 and Fb(t) > 0
then qb(t) = 0 for any t ∈ σ(Fb). Let tb > 0 denote the first time with a positive arrival rate of
type b customers; i.e., fb(tb) > 0. If Fa(tb) < 1 then there exists some ta > tb such that type a
customers arrive with a positive rate at time ta, i.e., fa(ta) > 0. The queue length at t ∈ (0, tb) for
type b customers is given by equation (12),
qb(t) = 2q0 − µbt = λaFa(t)− µbt ,
and for t ∈ [tb, ta),
qb(t) = λaFa(tb) + λb
∫ t
tb
fb(u) du− µbt .
If qb(tb) > 0 then in equilibrium we have that for t ∈ [tb, ta) qb(t) = qb(tb) and
d
dt
qb(t) = λbfb(t)− µb = 0 .
Therefore, for t ∈ [tb, ta) we further have that
qa(t) = λaFa(tb) + λb
∫ t
tb
fb(u) du− µat ,
and, as µa < µb,
d
dt
qa(t) = λbfb(t)− µa > λbfb(t)− µb = 0 .
Recall that qa(tb) ≥ q0 as tb /∈ σ(Fa), hence
qa(ta) > qa(tb) ≥ q0 ,
which contradicts the equilibrium assumption. We conclude that the only possible equilibrium such
that tb < ta is if
λbfb(t) ≤ µa < µb ∀t ∈ σ(Fb) ,
and therefore qb(t) = 0 for all t ∈ σ(Fb).
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Theorem 7. The (possibly multiple) Nash equilibria (Fa, Fb) satisfy the following:
(i) If T ≤ λa+λb2µb then Fa(0) = Fb(0) = 1.
(ii) If λa+λb2µb < T <
λa+2λb
2µb
then Fa(0) = 1, Fb(0) ∈ (0, 1) and fb(t) = µbλb for t ∈ (tb, T ], where
tb =
λa+λbFb(0)
2µb
and Fb(0) =
2µb
λb
(
λa+2λb
2µb
− T
)
.
(iii) If λa+2λb2µb ≤ T ≤
λa
2µa
+ λbµb then Fa(0) = 1, Fb(0) = 0 and fb(t) =
µb
λb
for t ∈ (tb, T ], where
tb = T − λbµb .
(iv) If λa2µa +
λb
µb
< T ≤ λaµa +
λb
µb
, then for type a customers, Fa(0) ∈ (0, 1), fa(t) = µaλa for t ∈ [ta, tb)
where ta =
λaFa(0)
2µa
and Fa(0) =
2µa
λa
(
λa
µa
+ λbµb − T
)
. For type b, Fb(0) = 0, fb(t) =
µb
λb
for
t ∈ [tb, T ], where tb = T − λbµb .
(v) Suppose one of the following conditions holds:
(v.a) µb ≥ 2µa and
λa + 2λb
2µa
< T <
λa + λb
µa
.
(v.b) µb < 2µa and
max
{
λa + 2λb
2µa
,
λa + λb
µa
− λbµb
µa(2µa − µb)
}
< T <
λa + λb
µa
.
Then there exists at least one equilibrium such that the equilibrium strategy of type a cus-
tomers is given by Fa(0) ∈ (0, 1), fa(t) = µaλa for t ∈ [ta, T ] where ta =
λaFa(0)+2λb
2µa
and
Fa(0) = 2
λa+λb−µaT
λa
. The strategy of type b customers is given by Fb(0) = 0, fb(t) =
µaµb
(λa+λb−µaT )(µb−2µa)+λbµb for t ∈ [tb, ta], where tb =
λaFa(0)
µb
.
(vi) If T > λaµa +
λb
µb
then there are multiple equilibria such that there are no arrivals at zero,
Fa(0) = Fb(0) = 0, both types can arrive on continuously and the queue is always empty.
Remark 1. The equilibrium solutions of cases (i)-(iii) are unique. Observe, however, that the
intervals for T in (iv) and (v) are not necessarily disjoint, and therefore, if they intersect then both
cases are equilibrium solutions. Similarly, the intervals may also intersect for cases (v) and (vi).
Case (v) is a partially degenerate equilibrium because type b customers expect zero delay and case
(vi) is fully degenerate because all customers expect zero delay. In the degenerate cases of (v) and
(vi) there exist a continuum of equilibria solutions because the arrival densities need not be uniform
as long as the queue always remains empty.
Proof. The proof constructs the possible equilibrium solutions and verifies the conditions are as
given by the theorem statement. The first three cases correspond to the unique non-degenerate
solutions satisfying Lemma 6(iii). In the last two cases we construct an equilibrium such that the
queue is always empty for at least one type of customers. In the latter cases we further explain
why there exist multiple equilibria solutions.
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(i) If Fa(0) = Fb(0) = 1 then the expected queue size at t > 0 for a customer of type i is
qi(u) = 2q0 − µiu = λa + λb − µiu, u ∈ (0, t) .
A type b customer will arrive at t if qb(t) ≤ q0, i.e., t ≥ tb = λa+λb2µb , but T ≤
λa+λb
2µb
≤ tb and
so no type b customer will deviate from Fb. Furthermore, µa < µb implies that qa(t) ≥ qb(t)
and so customers of type will certainly deviate from strategy Fa, hence this is indeed an
equilibrium and case (i) is verified.
(ii) Next consider Fa(0) = 1 and Fb(0) ∈ [0, 1). In this case q0 = λa+λbFb(0)2 and for any type b
customer the expected queue size at t > 0 such that there are no arrivals during (0, t) is
qb(u) = 2q0 − µbu = λa + λbFb(0)− µbu, u ∈ (0, t) .
Solving q0 = qb(tb) yields that fb(t) = 0 for t < tb =
λa+λbFb(0)
2µb
. By applying (12), the
equilibrium condition qb(t) = q0 for t ∈ [tb, T ] yields fb(t) = µbλb . The probability Fb(0) is
obtained by solving Fb(0) + (T − tb)µbλb = 1, yielding Fb(0) =
2µb
λb
(
λa+2λb
2µb
− T
)
. Finally
Fb(0) < 1 is equivalent to T >
λa+λb
2µb
and Fb(0) ≥ 0 is equivalent to T ≤ λa+2λb2µb , yielding case
(ii).
(iii) Next consider Fa(0) = 1 and Fb(0) = 0. In this case all type b customers arrive uniformly
with density fb(t) =
µb
λb
for t ∈ (tb, T ], where tb = T − λbµb . Type a customers will not deviate
from Fa if
qa(tb) = λa − µatb = λa − µa
(
T − λb
µb
)
≥ q0 = λa
2
,
and this is equivalent to T ≤ λa2µa +
λb
µb
. Moreover, type b customers will not deviate if
qb(tb) = λa − µbtb = λa − µb
(
T − λb
µb
)
≤ q0 = λa
2
,
which is equivalent to T > λa+2λb2µb and case (iii) is confirmed.
(iv) Now assume that Fa(0) ∈ [0, 1), Fb(0) = 0, fa(t) = µaλa for t ∈ [ta, tb) where ta =
λaFa(0)
2µa
,
Fb(0) = 0 and fb(t) =
µb
λb
for t ∈ [tb, T ]. Solving Fa(0) + (tb − ta)µaλa = 1 and (T − tb)
µb
λb
= 1
yields Fa(0) =
2µa
λa
(
λa
µa
+ λbµb − T
)
and tb = T − λbµb . Furthermore, Fa(0) < 1 is equivalent to
T > λa2µa +
λb
µb
and Fa(0) ≥ 0 is equivalent to T ≤ λaµa +
λb
µb
, verifying case (iv).
(v) We next consider a solution such that Fa(0) ∈ (0, 1) and Fb(0) = 0 such that Fa(ta) <
Fb(ta) = 1 for some ta < T . Let tb denote the first time such that f(tb) > 0. Lemma 6 implies
that qb(tb) = 0 in equilibrium, hence,
λaFa(0)− µbtb = 0 ⇔ tb = λaFa(0)
µb
. (13)
For t ∈ [tb, ta), the type b density is fb(t) = k, for some k > 0 such that λbk ≤ µa < µb.
The latter condition is necessary because Definition 2 states that qa(ta) = q0 and qa(tb) ≥ q0
(as ta ∈ σ(Fa) and tb /∈ σ(Fa)), hence λbk ≤ µa ensures that qa(ta) ≤ qa(tb). In addition,
(ta − tb)k = 1 yields
fb(t) = k = (ta − tb)−1, t ∈ [tb, ta) . (14)
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Furthermore, in equilibrium we have that
qa(ta) = λaFa(0) + λb − µata = q0 = λaFa(0)
2
,
hence
ta =
λaFa(0) + 2λb
2µa
. (15)
For t ∈ [ta, T ] we have that fa(t) = µaλa , yielding
(T − ta)µa
λa
+ Fa(0) = 1 . (16)
Combing (15) and (16) yields
Fa(0) = 2
λa + λb − µaT
λa
.
Combining (13)-(16) yields
k =
µaµb
(λa + λb − µaT )(µb − 2µa) + λbµb .
Recall that for this to be an equilibrium there is an extra condition 0 < λbk ≤ µa. Further-
more, 0 < Fa(0) < 1 is equivalent to
λa+2λb
2µa
< T < λa+λbµa . First observe that λbk ≤ µa is
equivalent to
T <
λa + λb
µa
.
We verify the condition k > 0 for the three possible cases:
• If µb = 2µa then k = µaλb and then λbk = µa.
• If µb > 2µa then a necessary condition for k > 0 is
T <
λa + λb
µa
+
λbµb
µa(µb − 2µa) .
• If µb < 2µa then a necessary condition for k > 0 is
T >
λa + λb
µa
− λbµb
µa(2µa − µb) .
To summarize, this equilibrium is possible if one of the conditions (v.a) or (v.b) holds. This
equilibrium is not unique because for small  you can choose tb = tb +  and k = k + g(),
where g is some continuous function, and all of the conditions will still be satisfied.
(vi) Finally, we consider the case of Fa(0) = Fb(0) = 0. We call this a degenerate case because
qa(t) = qb(t) = q0 = 0, ∀t ∈ [0, T ],
i.e., a queue is never formed and the system is not a bottleneck. Suppose that type a customers
arrive uniformly with density fa(t) =
µa
λa
on t ∈ [0, Ta] and type b customers arrive uniformly
with density fb(t) =
µb
λb
on t ∈ [Ta, Tb]. The above define proper distributions if Ta = λaµa and
Tb = ta +
λb
µb
. Therefore, this is an equilibrium if T ≥ Tb = λaµa +
λb
µb
, as in case (vi). The
equilibrium is not not unique because the above uniform distributions can be constructed on
any disjoint subsets of [0, T ], or even on subsets with intersection as long as λafa(t)+λbfb(t) ≤
µa for any t ∈ [0, T ].
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In Figure 1 we illustrate all possible non-degenerate equilibrium outcomes for fixed parameters
T = 1, λa = 1, λb = 2, µa = 1 and varying values of µb. When µb is low then all customers
arrive at t = 0 as seen in Figure 1a. As µb grows the optimistic (type b) customers become more
optimistic regarding service speed and will spread out more throughout the acceptance period as
seen in Figure 1b and Figure 1c. Finally, if µb is very high all of the optimistic customers arrive
towards the end of the period which results in pessimistic (type a) customers also mixing between
t = 0 and a continuous interval within the acceptance period.
t
0 1
0
1
Fa(t)
Fb(t)
(a) µb = 1.5
t
0 1
0
1
Fa(t)
Fb(t)
tb
Fb(0)
(b) µb = 2
t
0 1
0
1
Fa(t)
Fb(t)
tb
(c) µb = 4
t
0 1
0
1
Fa(t)
ta
Fa(0)
Fb(t)
tb
(d) µb = 8
Figure 1: Equilibrium arrival distributions (solid red for type a and dashed blue for type b) for
varying service rate µb of the optimistic type b customers. The other parameters are fixed: T =
1, λa = 1, λb = 2, µa = 1.
5 Discrete-time game
In this section, we consider a discrete-time queue with an acceptance period and two types of ar-
rival customers with type-dependent belief on their service times. There are several motivations
for studying the discrete-time system. Most notably, it enables a numerical computation the equi-
librium arrival distribution for general service times (see e.g., [23] for the case of homogeneous
customers with a common belief). The computational advantage is even more relevant for the
model with heterogeneous customer beliefs because, as was shown in Section 3, the structure of the
equilibrium is very elaborate even in the fully Markovian setting with exponential service times. In
particular, solving the equilibrium dynamics in continuous time seems intractable and there may
be multiple equilibria as indicated by the fluid approximation of Section 4. Another important
advantage of the discrete system is the flexibility to deal with systems that operate inherently
with predetermined time slots for admissions, i.e., in which the acceptance period is divided into
a discrete number of slots and arrivals are only allowed in the designated slots (see e.g., [2] for a
detailed review of the role of discrete time systems in modeling communication systems). Moreover,
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in [11] it was shown that limiting the number of possible arrival time slots may lower the expected
waiting time for all customers in equilibrium. Finally, the discrete-time system can also be used to
approximate a continuous-time system by considering a very large number of small slots. For this
discrete-time system, we propose a best-response based algorithm for computing the equilibrium
arrival distributions of both types of customers, and show the existence of the equilibrium arrival
distributions (see Sections 5.1 and 5.2). In Section 5.3 we present some numerical examples and
show that our algorithm gives similar equilibrium arrival distribution to that of the fluid model of
Section 4.
In what follows, we formally describe the discrete-time system studied in this section. The time
axis R is divided into time units of length one, and the unfinished workload (if any) in the system
decreases by one in each time units. The acceptance period is given by [0, (T + 1)τ) ⊂ R, where τ
and T are positive integers. The acceptance period is split into time slots of length τ , i.e.,
[0, (T + 1)τ) = ∪t∈T [tτ, (t+ 1)τ),
where T := {0, 1, 2, . . . , T} and [tτ, (t + 1)τ) is referred to as slot t. Customers can choose any
slot t ∈ T , and arrivals occur in the beginning of the slots. The population sizes of types a and
b customers follow iid Poisson random variables with mean λa and λb, respectively. We further
assume that the service times are positive integer valued random variables for either of the types.
For i ∈ C = {a, b}, let xi := (xi(k); k ≥ 1) denote the service time distribution with type i, where its
mean is denoted by χi :=
∑
k≥1 kxi(k). A mixed strategy is now a discrete probability distribution
(pt; t ∈ T ). A symmetric Nash equilibrium is given by a pair of distributions pa and pb with
respective cdf’s (Fa, Fb) satisfying Definition 2.
We first compute the mean unfinished workload for each customer’s type (a and b) given an
arrival distribution relying on the more detailed analysis of [23]. This is then used to construct a
sufficient and necessary condition so that (pa,pb) is Nash equilibrium. Finally, we give an algorithm
for computing the equilibrium.
In the following analysis all random variables and expectations are given for a pair of arrival
distributions (pa,pb), but we omit this from the notation for the sake of brevity. For i ∈ C and
t ∈ T , let Vi,t− denote the unfinished workload in system immediately before slot t with type i.
Recall that from Definition 1, the mean waiting time corresponding to belief i ∈ C is computed by
a workload process with iid service times with distribution xi. The probability distribution of Vi,t−
is denoted by vi,t = (vi,t(k); k ≥ 0), i.e., vi,t(k) = P(Vi,t− = k), k ≥ 0, i ∈ C, t ∈ T . Since there
is no arriving customer before slot 0, i.e., we have vi,0(k) = 1l(k = 0), where 1l(·) is the indicator
function of an event in the parenthesis.
The total work arriving in slot t is
Hi,t =
Nt∑
k=1
Xi,k ,
where Nt is a Poisson distributed random variable with mean λapa,t + λbpb,t, and Xi,k’s are iid
random variables with distribution xi. Observe that Hi,t follows a compound Poisson distribution,
and denote its probability distribution by hi,t := (hi,t(k); k ≥ 0), which is recursively computed
(see e.g., [26]). Figure 2 illustrates a sample path of the unfinished workload in view of type a
customers. Recall that Vi,t− (resp. Hi,t), i ∈ C and t ∈ T , denotes the unfinished (resp. total
arrival) workload just before the beginning of (resp. in the beginning of) slot t in view of type i.
In Figure 2, we can see that
Va,0−(ω) = 0, Va,1−(ω) = 2, Va,2−(ω) = 3, Ha,0(ω) = 4, Ha,1(ω) = 4.
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Figure 2: A sample path of the unfinished workload corresponding to a belief of type a, where
τ = 3, T = 2 and with the believe of deterministic service time of length 2.
The mean unfinished workload with customer’s type i ∈ C is computed as follows.
Lemma 8. For i ∈ C and t ∈ T , we have
E[Vi,t−] =
t−1∑
u=0
{
(λapa,u + λbpb,u)χi − τ +
τ−1∑
k=0
(τ − k)vi,u ∗ hi,u(k)
}
, (17)
where vi,u ∗ hi,u(k) :=
∑k
`=0 vi,u(`)hi,u(k − `), and the probability distribution of the unfinished
workload (vi,t(k); k ≥ 0) is recursively calculated by
vi,t(k) =
{∑τ
`=0 vi,t−1 ∗ hi,t−1(`), k = 0 ,
vi,t−1 ∗ hi,t−1(τ + k), k ≥ 1 .
(18)
Proof. Since in each slot, the unfinished work (if any) is processed by at most τ units, i.e.,
Vi,t− = (Vi,(t−1)− +Hi,t−1 − τ)+, i ∈ C, t ∈ T , (19)
then
E[Vi,t−] = E[(Vi,(t−1)− +Hi,t−1 − τ)1l(Vi,(t−1)− +Hi,t−1 ≥ τ)]
= E[Vi,(t−1)− +Hi,t−1 − τ ] + E[{τ − (Vi,(t−1)− +Hi,t−1)}1l(Vi,(t−1)− +Hi,t−1 ≤ τ − 1)] .
Since Vi,(t−1)− and Hi,t−1 are independent, the second term in the last equation is given by
E[{τ − (Vi,(t−1)− +Hi,t−1)}1l(Vi,(t−1)− +Hi,t−1 ≤ τ − 1)] =
τ−1∑
k=0
(τ − k)vi,t−1 ∗ hi,t−1(k) .
By combining these equations, we obtain (17). Equation (18) immediately follows by (19).
By Definition 2, the arrival distributions in equilibrium are given as follows.
Lemma 9. A pair of arrival distributions (pa,pb) is a symmetric (within types) Nash equilibrium
if and only if there exist positive numbers wi (i ∈ C) such that
pi,t =
1
λi
(
2
χi
(wi − E[Vi,t−])− λ−ip−i,t
)+
, i ∈ C, t ∈ T , (20)
where −i denotes the counterpart of i, i.e., if i = a, then −i = b, and vice versa.
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Proof. For i ∈ C and t ∈ T , let wi,t denote the expected waiting time of a tagged type i arrival
customer if she/he chooses slot t. From Definition 2, (pa,pb) is an equilibrium if there exist positive
numbers wi (i ∈ C) such that
wi,t = wi, t ∈ σ(pi) , (21)
wi,t ≥ wi, t /∈ σ(pi) . (22)
Since
wi,t = E[Vi,t−] +
λapa,t + λbpb,t
2
χi, i ∈ C, t ∈ T , (23)
then equations (21) and (22) are rewritten by
pi,t =
1
λi
(
2
χi
(wi − E[Vi,t−])− λ−ip−i,t
)
, t ∈ σ(pi) , (24)
and
pi,t = 0 ≥ 1
λi
(
2
χi
(wi − E[Vi,t−])− λ−ip−i,t
)
, t /∈ σ(pi) ,
respectively, which imply (20).
5.1 Algorithm for computing equilibrium distributions
Lemma 9 provides a recursive relation in the form of Equation (20) that allows the iterative compu-
tation of the probability to arrive in every time slot t ∈ T . For every type i ∈ C this recursion relies
on a given distribution for the other type j 6= i. We leverage this structure to derive a best-response
type algorithm that fixes the distribution of one type i in each iteration and then computes the
distribution of the other type j, and then repeating this procedure for the j given the computed
distribution for i. A point of convergence is clearly a Nash equilibrium, although we do not argue
that the algorithm is guaranteed to converge. In practice, this procedure finds equilibrium points
very efficiently.
For a fixed i ∈ C, assume that the arrival distribution of type −i customers is given by p−i. Then
the best response of type i customers is computed by a discretized (with accuracy parameter  > 0)
search procedure that we call Algorithm 1, which is similar to the methods applied in [11] and [23].
Algorithm 1 is detailed in Appendix B, and here we treat it as a function Alg.1(p−i,λ,xi, ) 7→ pi
that returns a probability distribution pi that satisfies (20) for any distribution of the other type
p−i, system parameters λ := (λa, λb), xi, and accuracy parameter  > 0.
Note that best-response here refers to all customers of type i using the same distribution, and not
to an individual best response for an individual customer of type i. This is then used iteratively in
Algorithm 2 to find equilibrium arrival distributions, i.e., to find positive numbers (wa, wb) and the
corresponding arrival distributions (pa,pb) jointly satisfying (20), which was shown to be equivalent
to the Definition 2 of a Nash equilibrium in Lemma 9.
We next give an iterated best-response algorithm to obtain a pair of equilibrium arrival distri-
butions.
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Algorithm 2: Iterated best response
Input: λ := (λa, λb), x := (xa,xb),  > 0, δ > 0
Output: (pea,p
e
b) (equilibrium)
init p0a := (1, 0, . . . , 0), p
0
b := (1, 0, . . . , 0)
init k := 0, ∆ := δ
while ∆ ≥ δ do
set pk+1a := Alg.1(p
k
b ,λ,xa, ), p
k+1
b := Alg.1(p
k+1
a ,λ,xb, )
set ∆ := max{||pk+1a − pka||, ||pk+1b − pkb ||}
set k := k + 1
end while
set (pea,p
e
b) := (p
k
a,p
k
b )
return (pea,p
e
b)
Remark 2. Note that any point of convergence of Algorithm 2 is an equilibrium because no single
customer can deviate and obtain a lower expected waiting time by unilaterally changing the arrival
distribution. However, we do not provide a proof of convergence of the algorithm. Best response
dynamics are known to converge for games with very specific utility functions, such as submodular
games (see [24]) and potential games (see [20]), but for a system with elaborate and non-explicit
dynamics, as is the case here, convergence guarantees are very hard to prove (or may not hold).
Nevertheless, because any convergence point is an equilibrium, such algorithms are very useful in
computing equilibrium points even in cases where there is no theoretical guarantee. Indeed, in our
numerical testing and examples an equilibrium point was reached for every instance of the arrival
game tested.
5.2 Existence of equilibrium arrival distributions
In [23] it was shown that an equilibrium exists in the single-type game. Furthermore, it was
conjectured that the equilibrium is unique, and this conjecture was strengthened by numerical
analysis. The existence result can be extended to the two-type game by applying Kakutani’s fixed
point theorem. The issue of uniqueness is an open problem even for the single-type game, but there
is reason to believe the conjecture holds in that case. In the multi-class setting it is less clear if the
solution should be unique. Recall that for the deterministic fluid model Theorem 7 showed that
multiple equilibria are possible for some parameter settings.
Proposition 10. A symmetric (within type) pair of equilibrium arrival distributions (pea,p
e
b) exists
for any game parameters.
Proof. For type i ∈ C customers, given any arrival distribution p−i of customers with the other
type, denote the outcome of Algorithm 1 by BRi(p−i) : [0, 1]T+1 → [0, 1]T+1. The algorithm always
returns a valid distribution due to the existence result of [23] for the single-type game. Let
BR(pa,pb) := (BRa(pb),BRb(pa)) : [0, 1]T+1 × [0, 1]T+1 → [0, 1]T+1 × [0, 1]T+1 ,
denote the two dimensional mapping of the pair of distributions (pa,pb) to their respective BRi
sets. By applying Kakutani’s fixed point theorem (e.g. Lemma 20.1 of [21]) we can conclude that
BR has a fixed point (pa,pb) = BR(pa,pb). In particular:
(i) [0, 1]T+1 is a compact and closed set,
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(ii) BR(pa,pb) is a single point in [0, 1]T+1 × [0, 1]T+1, hence it is trivially a convex set for any
(pa,pb),
(iii) and BR has a closed graph (because solutions of (20) are continuous with respect to all
coordinates of pi).
5.3 Numerical analysis
In this section, we show several examples of the equilibrium arrival distributions for different service-
time distributions for the discrete-time system. The equilibrium arrival distributions are computed
using Algorithm 2. We demonstrate that Algorithm 2 gives similar equilibrium arrival distributions
to that of the fluid model for the non-degenerate cases in Theorem 7 of Section 4. To this end, the
intervals for T in Theorem 7 (i)–(iv) are denoted by (0, ξ1], (ξ1, ξ2), [ξ2, ξ3] and (ξ3, ξ4], respectively,
where
(ξ1, ξ2, ξ3, ξ4) :=
(
λa + λb
2µb
,
λa + 2λb
2µb
,
λa
2µa
+
λb
µb
,
λa
µa
+
λb
µb
)
.
In the following examples (see Figures 3–5), both the time unit and slot length are set to 1[min];
the mean number of arriving customers with beliefs a and b are given by λ := (λa, λb) = (50, 50);
the pair of the mean-service times are given by (χa, χb) = (4, 2). We consider the following three
cases for the service-time distributions: xi (i ∈ C) is a deterministic distribution (see Figure 3);
xi (i ∈ C) is a geometric distribution (see Figure 4); xi (i ∈ C) is a mixture of two geometric
distributions (see Figure 5). The parameters of the mixture of two geometric distributions are
chosen so that their coefficient of variations (CVs, for short) are twice of that of the geometric
distributions. Under the above parameter settings, we have (ξ1, ξ2, ξ3, ξ4) = (100, 150, 200, 300). In
Figures 3–5, the following four cases for the length of the acceptance period are considered:
τ × (T + 1) =

60 ∈ (0, ξ1] (i.e., Case (i) in Theorem 7)
120 ∈ (ξ1, ξ2] (i.e., Case (ii) in Theorem 7)
180 ∈ (ξ2, ξ3] (i.e., Case (iii) in Theorem 7)
240 ∈ (ξ3, ξ4] (i.e., Case (iv) in Theorem 7)
In each case, the equilibrium arrival distributions are computed by
(pea,p
e
b) = Alg.2(λ,xa,xb, , δ), (25)
where  = δ := 10−5.
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Figure 3: cdfs of the equilibrium arrival distributions computed by (25), where the service time
follows a deterministic distribution
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Case (ii)
Type a (E[W] = 160.0)
Type b (E[W] = 80.0)
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Figure 4: cdfs of the equilibrium arrival distributions computed by (25), where the service time
follows a geometric distribution, where CVa = 0.87, CVb = 0.71
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Type b (E[W] = 28.7)
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Case (iv)
Type a (E[W] = 97.0)
Type b (E[W] = 8.9)
Figure 5: cdfs of the equilibrium arrival distributions computed by (25), where the service time
follows a mixtures of two geometric distributions, where CVa = 1.74, CVb = 1.42
In all numerical examples Algorithm 2 converged to a unique equilibrium solution. The cdf’s
of the equilibrium arrival distributions for the four cases are illustrated in Figures 3–5. It can be
seen that the solutions have a similar form to the corresponding explicit linear solutions in cases
(i)(iv) in Theorem 7 (which are illustrated in Figure 1). Furthermore, we can see that the expected
waiting time increases as the CV of the service time gets large.
6 Agent-based model
We now present a discrete-time agent-based model (ABM for short) as a behavioral alternative to
the equilibrium analysis of Section 5. Our ABM extends that of [23] to account for the scenario of
server uncertainty and noisy signals as modeled in Section 2.1. The customers arrive to the system
repeatedly and choose their arrival time slot according to a decision model that combines random
exploration and minimization of the estimated waiting time according to the past delays experienced
by the individual customer. We then compare its long-term averaged arrival distributions with
the equilibrium calculated by Algorithm 2. Recall the information and rationality assumptions
discussed in Section 2.2. The rational models of the previous sections corresponded to Assumptions
(FR)–fully informed rational customers, and (BR)–customers with bounded rationality or limited
information. This section deals with an example of assumption (L)–Agent based model, i.e., with
customers that have no knowledge of the system parameters (or cannot make the necessary waiting
time computations, but rather react to their own past delay experiences.
We assume that there is a finite large pool of N potential customers labeled as the numbers
in N := {1, 2, . . . , N} that join independently at any given day with a probability δN such that
δN → 0 as N → ∞ and NδN = λ. The total arrivals in a given day is therefore A ∼ Bin(N, δN )
and can be approximated by Poisson(λ) for large N . This formulation enables giving customers
identities which is important for the learning framework as each customer has their own personal
history of waiting time observations. As in Section 2.1, the system dynamics “on each day” is
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described as follows. On day d (d ≥ 1), the service mode is denoted by Md ∈ C, where
P(Md = a) = p, P(Md = b) = 1− p .
When the service mode Md is given by i ∈ C, during day d, the system offers iid service times
following the distribution xi with mean χi. The signal (i.e., belief) on the service mode received
by customer k (k ∈ N ), denoted by Y (k)d , is given by
Y
(k)
d = MdS
(k)
d + (a+ b−Md)(1− S(k)d ) ,
where S
(k)
d ∈ {0, 1} be an iid Bernoulli random variable with P(S(k)d = 1) = q. The server state
and signals on any day are independent of each other and of the states and signals in all other
days. We assume customers do not know p or q but they do know that q > 12 , and so the signal is
informative. The acceptance period is the discrete grid T = {0, τ, . . . , T τ} as in Section 5.
On day d ≥ 1 an arriving customer k observes information Y (k)d = i ∈ C, and chooses a time
slot t
(k,i)
d = t ∈ T according to a decision rule that will be elaborated on later, and records the
waiting time W
(k,i)
d,t . Let W¯
(k)
d := (W¯
(k,i)
d,t ; i ∈ C, t ∈ T ) denote the 2× (T + 1) matrix of customer
k’s average waiting times, where W¯
(k,i)
d,t is the average waiting time that customer k with belief i
experiences when she/he arrives at slot t during first d days. Define W¯
(k)
0 as a zero matrix, i.e.,
W¯
(k,i)
0,t := 0 for i ∈ C and t ∈ T . The daily decisions involve randomization between past experience
and random experimentation. We denote the experimentation probability as a function of trials as
θ(x) = e
c1
1−ec2x , (26)
where c1, c2 > 0 (see [23] for further discussion on these learning dynamics). On day d, an arriving
customer k with belief i (i ∈ C) chooses her/his arrival slot uniformly from T with probability
1− θ(A(k,i)(d)), where A(k,i)(d) denotes the number of customer k’ arrivals with belief i during the
first d−1 days. On the other hand, with probability θ(A(k,i)(d)), she/he chooses the time slot with
the minimal average experienced waiting time during the first d− 1 days.
Therefore the decision rule can be written as follows,
t
(k,i)
d =

Uniform(T ), w.p. 1− θ(A(k,i)(d)) ,
arg mint∈T W
(k,i)
d−1,t, w.p. θ(A
(k,i)(d)) .
(27)
By (26) and (27) we have that as d grows the probability of uniform exploration diminishes and
the minimal average waiting time is chosen with an arbitrarily high probability. Consider a tagged
customer k and her/his experienced average waiting time W
(k,i)
d,t on days with belief i ∈ C such that
the specific slot t has been sampled. Clearly, as the number of days grows all customers will join
and receive both types of signals infinitely often. The limiting proportion of the number of times
slot t ∈ T∞ is chosen with belief i is given by
p
(k,i)
t := lim
D→∞
1
max{1, A(k,i)(D)}
D∑
d=1
1(customer k arrives on day d, t
(k,i)
d = t) , (28)
and her/his limiting average waiting time during the acceptance period, denoted by w(k,i), is given
by
w(k,i) =
∑
t∈T
p
(k,i)
t W¯
(k,i)
t , (29)
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where W¯
(k,i)
t := limd→∞ W¯
(k,i)
d,t for t ∈ T . In the subsequent two sections, we consider the averaged
arrival distributions and mean waiting times over all customers as follows.
p
(i)
N :=
1
N
N∑
k=1
(p
(k,i)
t ; t ∈ T ) , w(i)N :=
1
N
N∑
k=1
w(k,i) (30)
for each belief i ∈ C.
6.1 Numerical comparison between ABM and bounded rationality
In what follows, we compare the cumulative distribution function (cdf, for short) of arrival time
and mean waiting time calculated by the ABM with the one calculated by Algorithm 2. In the
latter computation of the Nash equilibrium we make assumption (BR) in Section 2.2: customers
fully trust their signal and assume all customers have the corresponding service time distribution
(without the posterior update). The results which are computed by Algorithm 2 and the ABM are
referred to as (BR) and (L), respectively.
The parameter settings of the agent-based model are given as follows: the length of the accep-
tance period is set to 60 minutes and is divided into (T + 1) = 20 slots, i.e., the length of each slot
is given by τ = 3 [min]; the mean number of population is given by λ = 10; the server uncertainty
and the strength of the signal are given by p = 0.5 and q = 0.9, respectively; the mean service-times
in modes a and b are given by χa = 4 and χb = 2, respectively. With these parameter settings, the
mean number of arrival customers with beliefs a and b are given by λa = λ(pq+ (1− p)(1− q)) = 5
and λb = λ(p(1 − q) + (1 − p)q) = 5, respectively. As in Section 5.3, we consider the same three
service-time distributions, i.e., deterministic, geometric distribution, and a mixture of two geo-
metric distributions. For these three distributions, Figures 6–8 respectively show the comparison
between the cdf calculated by Algorithm 2 and the ones obtained by simulations of the ABM, where
every customer arrives at the system 1, 000 times on average.
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Figure 6: Comparison between cdfs of the equilibrium arrival distributions calculated by (25) and
ones obtained by the averaged arrival distributions (30) calculated by ABM, where the service time
follows a deterministic distribution
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Figure 7: Comparison between cdfs of the equilibrium arrival distributions calculated by (25) and
ones obtained by the averaged arrival distributions (30) calculated by ABM, where the service time
follows a geometric distribution
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Figure 8: Comparison between cdfs of the equilibrium arrival distributions calculated by (25) and
ones obtained by the averaged arrival distributions (30) calculated by ABM, where the service time
follows a mixtures of two geometric distributions
From Figures 6–8, we can see the outcome is quite different, i.e., the gap between the cdfs of
(BR) and (L) is quite large for each belief (a and b). Specifically, the averaged arrival distributions
of the ABM (see (L) in the figures) tend to spread over the acceptance period. On the other hand,
for the equilibrium arrival distributions calculated by Algorithm 2 (see (BR) in the figures), the
arrivals of beliefs a and b customers tend to the equilibrium arrival distributions of beliefs a and b
tend to lie in the first and the last half of the acceptance period, respectively.
The above differences between the arrival distributions of the ABM and equilibrium models
also have implications for social welfare. In the homogenous case, when customers are more spread
out then waiting times are decreased and thus social welfare is higher (see [11] for detailed analysis
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of socially optimal arrival strategies). In the case of heterogeneous beliefs customers tend to arrive
closer to their own type but further away from the other type (or on completely disjoint intervals
as in the fluid model), thus the effect on social welfare may be negative or positive, depending on
the exact system parameters. In Figures 6–8 we observe that in all cases the mean waiting time is
higher (or equal) for type a customers in the bounded rationality equilibrium than in the long term
average of the ABM, while the opposite is true for type b customers, i.e., a lower mean waiting time
in equilibrium. For example, in Figure 7, the belief b’s mean waiting time in ABM is about twice as
high than that of NE, while for type a customers the mean waiting time in ABM is slightly lower
than that of the NE (less than 10% lower in the ABM). Our numerical analysis therefore suggests
that in terms of social welfare, customers who just react to their past experiences can sometimes
be better off than customers with (limited) knowledge of the system parameters and dynamics.
A possible explanation for this gap is that in the ABM customers are eventually estimating the
correct properties of the system, while the customers with bounded rationality are computing the
‘wrong’ equilibrium. The sequel shows that the gap is indeed diminished when customers are fully
rational.
6.2 Numerical comparison between ABM and full rationality
The queueing game under the bounded rationality assumption (BR) does not take into account
the information structure given by the probabilities p and q. A more appropriate comparison with
the ABM (L) is therefore with the queueing game under assumption (FR) that assumes customers
make the posterior update of expectations as detailed in Section 2.1. For an arrival customer with
belief i (i ∈ C) in the ABM, the posterior arrival rates of the other customers with beliefs a and b
are given by (1) and (2), νi := λ(αai, αbi).
First consider the service time distribution of an arrival customer with belief i (i ∈ C). Similar
to (3), let zi (i ∈ C) denote the service time with mean ζi, then
z := (za, zb) = (ηaaxa + ηbaxb, ηabxa + ηbbxb) .
Therefore, in the view point of belief a (belief b) arrival customers, the arrival rates to the system
are νa (νb), and the service time random variables of beliefs a and b customers are distributed as
z. Furthermore, the equilibrium arrival distributions, denoted by (pˆea, pˆ
e
b), are computed by
(pˆea, •) = Alg.2(νa, z, , δ), (•, pˆeb) = Alg.2(νb, z, , δ) (31)
In what follows, we compare the cumulative distribution function (cdf, for short) of arrival time
and mean waiting time of the ABM with those obtained for the equilibrium by (31). In line with the
customer rationality and knowledge assumptions in Section 2.2, the results which are computed by
Algorithm 2 are referred to as (FR). The parameter settings are the same as that of the preceding
section, i.e., λ = 10, (p, q) = (0.5, 0.9) and (χa, χb) = (4.0, 2.0), then we have νa = (8.2, 1.8),
νb = (1.8, 8.2) and (ζa, ζb) = (3.8, 2.2).
The results are displayed in Figures 9–11, and we can see that the resulting cdfs of the arrival
distributions and mean waiting times of the equilibrium (FR) are closer to the outcome of the ABM
(L). However, the distribution resulting from the learning dynamics of the ABM is still more spread
out than the equilibrium distribution, although the difference is much smaller than that observed
in the comparison with the bounded rationality equilibrium of the previous section. In particular,
the optimistic type b customers consistently arrive at t = 0 with positive probabilities even when
the equilibrium prediction is that they only start arriving later. On the other hand, pessimistic
type a customers arrive at the last slots with positive probability even though they would not do
28
so in equilibrium. These discrepancies are due to the estimation bias resulting from ignoring the
system parameters and information structure.
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Figure 9: Comparison between cdfs of the equilibrium arrival distributions calculated by (31)
and the averaged arrival distributions (30) calculated by ABM, where the service time follows a
deterministic distribution.
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Figure 10: Comparison between cdfs of the equilibrium arrival distributions calculated by (31)
and the averaged arrival distributions (30) calculated by ABM, where the service time follows a
geometric distribution.
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Figure 11: Comparison between cdfs of the equilibrium arrival distributions calculated by (31)
and the averaged arrival distributions (30) calculated by ABM, where the service time follows a
mixtures of two geometric distributions.
7 Conclusion
This paper has introduced a general framework to analyze the arrival distributions to a bottleneck
queue with multiple customer types that differ in their belief regarding the service time distribu-
tion. Two models were presented. First, a game where rational customers that know all of the
system parameters, including the mechanism driving uncertainty, with the solution given by a Nash
equilibrium. Second, a dynamic learning model in which customers adapt their decisions based on
past experience. Constructive procedures have been provided for the computation of the arrival
distribution in both cases.
Our framework can be extended in several natural directions. From an economic point of view,
more elaborate cost functions can be considered, e.g. tardiness or order penalties and rewards for
service. The customers may have heterogeneous features that may be due to individual preferences
(e.g. waiting costs) or partial information (e.g. random value of service). Such games may also
combine multiple n > 2 types of customers or beliefs. From a queueing perspective, different
system configurations may be considered, e.g. a multi-server system with uncertainty regarding
the number of servers. Both our equilibrium and learning analysis can be extended to the above
settings.
The learning model of Section 6 can be seen as a simple first attempt at formulating interesting
learning dynamics for the arrival time problem to a bottleneck queue. There are several issues that
are perhaps of interest to explore further. Notably, accurate asymptotic analysis of the average
arrival distribution. This can be combined with further investigation of the bias brought on by the
average waiting time estimation, and can it be improved by decision rules that are still reasonably
simple. For example, we assumed that the information quality is unknown, i.e. customers just know
that q > 12 . If we further assume that customer observe service times, then q can be estimated as
follows. Denote by Xdi the service time observed on day d when the belief was y ∈ C, and let X¯i be
the respective average service time on days (up to day d) that the service belief was y. By the law
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of large numbers, X¯
(d)
a →P qχa + (1− q)χb, and this yields an asymptotically unbiased estimator
q¯(d)a =
X¯
(d)
a − χb
χa − χb .
An interesting question is then if the above can be used to make a simpler decision role that relies
on multiple estimators for the system parameters, i.e. arrival and service rates as well as the
information strength. Of course, such a learning process again assumes customers have the ability
and resources to make more elaborate computations for the decision making, but it is interesting
to examine what can be achieved with slightly more sophisticated estimation and decision rules.
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Appendices
A Detailed proof of Lemma 2
To prove Lemma 2 we construct a coupling of the virtual waiting time and queueing processes for
both types of customers and show that for every sample path type a customers face a longer queue
and waiting time than type b customers for any arrival time t ∈ T .
Lemma 11. Let Xi,k ∼ exp(µi) denote the job size distribution of the k’th arrival when the service
distribution is of type i ∈ C customers. If µa < µb then the virtual waiting time Va and the queue
length Qa of type a customers is stochastically larger than the virtual waiting time Vb and queue
length Qb of type b customers for any given strategy profile (Fa, Fb):
Vb(t) <st Va(t), Qb(t) ≤st Qa(t), ∀t ∈ [0, T ] ,
which further implies that
EVb(t) ≤ EVa(t), EQb(t) ≤ EQa(t), ∀t ∈ [0, T ] .
Proof. The virtual waiting time, or workload, for type i ∈ C customers can be constructed as
follows: the input process of work is a non-homogeneous Poisson process defined by the arrival
strategies, each job has a size of Xi, and work is continuously processed at a rate of one per unit
of time. The following arguments are for a sample path constructed of the identical arrival process
and coupled sequences of job sizes {Xi,k}∞k=1 such that Xa,k ≥ Xb,k for all k ≥ 1. Specifically, let
Uk ∼Unif[0, 1] and denote
Xki = − 1
µi
logUk ,
then clearly Xa,k =
µb
µa
Xb,k > Xb,k for all k ≥ 1. For any strategy profile (Fa, Fb), the virtual
waiting time for a type i ∈ C arriving at t ∈ T is given by
Vi(t) := Ai(t)− t+ Li(t) ,
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where Ai(t) is a non-homogeneous compound Poisson process with cumulative rate λaFa(t)+λbFb(t)
and jump sizes Xi, and
Li(t) :=
(
− inf
s∈[0−,t]
{Ai(s)− s} − V0
)+
.
Observe that Li(t) is a non-decreasing process that increases only when Vi(t) = 0 and that Aa(0) > 0
if and only if Ab(0) > 0. Suppose that Aa(0), Ab(0) > 0 and denote τi = inf{t ≥ 0 : Vi(t) = 0},
then as Aa(t) ≥ Ab(t) we have that
Va(t) = Aa(t)− t ≥ Ab(t)− t = Vb(t), t ∈ [0, τb] .
Furthermore, as Xa,k > Xb,k for all jobs, the number of departures from queue a is at most equal to
the number of departures from queue b during [0, τb] because both servers are working continuously.
The common arrival time of jobs to both systems further implies that
Qa(t) ≥ Qb(t), t ∈ [0, τb] .
The process Lb(t) increases after τb as long as Vb(t) = 0, but clearly 0 = Vb(t) ≤ Va(t) and
0 = Qb(t) ≤ Qa(t) during any such period. If a jump Ab(t) − Ab(t−) occurs at t < τa then Va(t)
has a bigger jump than Vb(t) both and the dominance remains until the next time s such that
Vb(s) = 0. This continues until τa for which
Va(τa) = Vb(τa) = Qa(τa) = Qb(τa) = 0 ,
and both Vi stay at zero until the next arrival time and the same process starts again with a new
jump for both processes. The same argument is valid when Aa(0) = Ab(0) = 0 and the process
starts at the time of the first arrival. We conclude that for every sample path Va(t) ≥ Vb(t) for all
t ∈ T and Va(s) > Vb(s) for all S ⊂ T such that S is a non-empty union of positive intervals, i.e.,
the set S has non-zero measure. Similarly, the same holds for Qa(t) and Qb(t).
B Best response algorithms
This appendix details Algorithm 1 and a necessary subroutine that we denote Algorithm 1-1. The
purpose of the algorithm is to find the symmetric within type best response arrival distribution pi,
that satisfies the equilibrium condition (20), when the customers of the other type arrive according
to p−i. The outline is as follows: (1) finding the first time slot θ ∈ T such that pi,θ > 0, (2)
a bisection search for the value of pi,θ which uniquely defines all probabilities pi,u for u > θ, (3)
stopping the procedure when
∑T
u=θ pi,u = 1. Algorithm 1 is designed for step (1) and checking the
equilibrium condition of (3), and Algorithm 1-1 performs the bisection search of part (2).
Note that the implementation of the algorithm may be refined to make it more efficient, but
the purpose of the description here is to provide a concise description. For example, in line 4 of
Algorithm 1-1, we may choose p
(R)
i,θ in a slightly better way, e.g., p
(R)
i,θ = min {1,Equation (24)}, but
we’ve chosen p
(R)
i,θ := 1 for the simplicity of the presentation.
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Algorithm 1: Symmetric best response of type i to p−i.
Input: p−i, λ := (λa, λb), xi,  > 0
Output: pi
init θ := 0
while θ ≤ T do
init pi := (0, 0, . . . , 0)
compute (wi,t; 0 ≤ t ≤ θ) by (23)
set wi := wi,θ, wmin := min(wi,t; 0 ≤ t ≤ θ − 1), where min(φ) :=∞
if wi < wmin then
compute (pi,t; θ ≤ t ≤ T ) by Alg.1-1(pi,p−i,λ,xi, θ, )
else
θ := θ + 1
end if
end while
return pi
Algorithm 1-1: Subroutine in Algorithm 1 (Bisection search).
Input: pi, p−i, λ := (λa, λb), xi, θ,  > 0
Output: pi, θ
init p
(L)
i := (0, 0, ..., 0), p
(M)
i := (0, 0, ..., 0), p
(R)
i := (0, 0, ..., 0)
set p
(R)
i,θ := 1, p
(M)
i,θ := (p
(L)
i,θ + p
(R)
i,θ )/2
while true do
for k = L,M,R do
compute wi,θ by (23) with pi := p
(k)
i
init w
(k)
i := wi,θ
compute (p
(k)
i,t ; θ + 1 ≤ t ≤ T ) by (20) with wi := w(k)i , pi := p(k)i
end for
if 1−  < ||p(M)i || < 1 +  then
set pi := p
(M)
i , θ :=∞
break
else if ||p(L)i || > 1 then
set θ := θ + 1
break
else if ||p(M)i || < 1 then
set p
(L)
i,θ := p
(M)
i,θ , p
(M)
i,θ := (p
(L)
i,θ + p
(R)
i,θ )/2
else if ||p(M)i || > 1 then
set p
(R)
i,θ := p
(M)
i,θ , p
(M)
i,θ := (p
(L)
i,θ + p
(R)
i )/2
end if
end while
return pi, θ
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